AQ/T 3033-2010.Safety design management guidelines for chemical construction projects.
1 Scope
AQ/T 3033 specifies the general mode and basic elements of safety design management for chemical construction projects (hereinafter referred to as projects).
AQ/T 3033 is applicable to the construction projects of new, rebuilt and expanded hazardous chemical production and storage facilities, as well as chemical production facilities and facilities with the use or production of hazardous chemicals. The scope of safety design for chemical construction projects (hereinafter referred to as project safety design) includes three stages: pre-design, basic engineering design and detailed engineering design commissioned by the owner.
AQ/T 3033 is not applicable to construction projects such as exploration, mining and auxiliary storage of hazardous chemicals, long-distance oil and natural gas pipelines and auxiliary storage, and auxiliary storage of urban gas.
2 Terms and definitions
The following terms and definitions apply to this standard.
2.1
hazardous chemical
Chemicals with dangerous characteristics such as flammability, explosion, toxicity and corrosion, which are likely to cause personal injury, property damage and environmental pollution during production, storage, transportation, use and waste disposal, are all hazardous chemicals.
2.2
inherently safer design
In the design process, the process and its equipment are endowed with the inherent function of fundamentally preventing accidents by means of reduction, mitigation, substitution and simplification.
2.3
hazard identification:
The process of identifying the existence of hazardous sources and determining their characteristics based on the physical and chemical properties of raw materials, intermediates and products, the evaluated equipment, facilities, process flow and device layout.
2.4
Tolerable risk
According to the level of today's society, the risk that can be accepted within a given range.
2.5
Process safety
Prevent the accidental release of hazardous substances or energy that has a serious impact on safety, the environment or the enterprise.
This standard specifies the general model and basic elements of safety design management for chemical construction projects (hereinafter referred to as projects). This standard applies to the construction projects of new, rebuilt and expanded hazardous chemical production and storage facilities, as well as chemical production facilities and facilities with the use or production of hazardous chemicals. The scope of safety design of chemical construction projects includes three stages: pre-design commissioned by the owner, basic engineering design and detailed engineering design. This standard does not apply to construction projects such as exploration, mining and auxiliary storage of hazardous chemicals, long-distance oil and natural gas pipelines and auxiliary storage, and auxiliary storage of urban gas.
Appendices A, B and C of this standard are informative appendices.
This standard is proposed by the State Administration of Work Safety. This standard
is under the jurisdiction of the Chemical Safety Technical Committee of the National Technical Committee for Work Safety Standardization (TC288/SC3).
The main drafting units of this standard are: China Petroleum and Chemical Engineering Exploration and Design Association, China Chemical Safety Association.
The main drafters of this standard are: Yuan Niu, Ren Lijian, Chen Fengying, Fan Jingguang, Yang Zhenkui, Liu Limin, Hu Chen, Ouyang Xian, Shu Xiaoqin, Chang Hong, Zou Xiquan, Wang Shifang, Xia Lansheng, Tang Min, Ding Xiaojing.
This standard is released for the first time.

ICS13.100
Registration number:
People's Republic of China Safety Production Industry Standard AQ/T3033-2010
Safety design management guidelines for chemical construction projects Construction projects 2010-09-06 release
State Administration of Work Safety
2011-05-01 implementation
Terms and definitions
Project safety design procedure
Project safety design planning
Process hazard source analysis
Project safety countermeasures
Project safety design review
8 Project safety design change controlbzxz.net
Appendix A (informative appendix) Example of risk assessment method
Appendix B (informative appendix) Safety design inspection outline for chemical construction projects Appendix C (informative appendix) Example of safety design inspection table for chemical construction projects TYKAONIKACa-
AQ/T3033-2010
Appendix A, Appendix B and Appendix C of this standard are informative appendices. This standard is proposed by the State Administration of Work Safety. AQ/T3033-2010
This standard is under the jurisdiction of the Chemical Safety Subcommittee of the National Technical Committee for Work Safety Standardization (TC288/SC3). The main drafting units of this standard are: China Petroleum and Chemical Engineering Exploration and Design Association, China Chemical Safety Association. The main drafters of this standard are: Yuan Niu, Ren Lijian, Chen Fengying, Fan Jingguang, Yang Zhenkui, Liu Limin, Hu Chen, Ouyang Xian, Shu Xiaoqin, Chang Hong, Zou Xiquan, Wang Shifang, Xia Lansheng, Tang Min, Ding Xiaojing. This standard is published for the first time.
AQ/T3033-2010
This standard is compiled based on the content and requirements of relevant national laws and regulations on work safety, absorbs advanced concepts of foreign safety design, summarizes the engineering practice of large-scale chemical construction projects in China, and combines the current status of safety design of chemical construction projects in my country. It aims to standardize and guide the safety design management of chemical construction projects, improve the quality of intrinsic safety design, and prevent and reduce safety accidents in chemical enterprises from the source of design. The safety design of chemical construction projects should reduce the possible risks of chemical construction projects to the acceptable level of today's society within the scope stipulated by laws and contracts through comprehensive and systematic process hazard source analysis, scientific and close safety design and review, and reasonable and effective safety countermeasures, so as to achieve the goal of safety design of chemical construction projects. The safety design of chemical construction projects should follow the principle of intrinsic safety design, adopt reduction, mitigation, substitution, simplification and other means, and eliminate or reduce the hazard source from the design source by partially changing to non-hazardous or less dangerous materials or processes. The safety design of chemical construction projects should follow the principle of reasonable risk reduction, and adopt appropriate and reliable safety countermeasures to reduce the risks within the expected life cycle of chemical construction projects to the reasonable and feasible minimum level as much as possible under the premise of technical feasibility and economic rationality. iYKAONKAca=
1Scope
Guidelines for Safety Design Management of Chemical Construction Projects AQ/T3033-2010
This standard specifies the general model and basic elements of safety design management of chemical construction projects (hereinafter referred to as "projects"). This standard applies to the construction of new, rebuilt, and expanded hazardous chemical production and storage facilities, as well as chemical production facilities and facilities that use or produce hazardous chemicals. The scope of chemical construction project safety design (hereinafter referred to as project safety design) includes three stages: pre-design, basic engineering design, and detailed engineering design commissioned by the owner.
This standard does not apply to construction projects such as exploration, mining, and auxiliary storage of hazardous chemicals, long-distance oil and natural gas pipelines and auxiliary storage, and urban gas auxiliary storage. 2 Terms and Definitions
The following terms and definitions apply to this standard. 2.1
Hazardous Chemicalshazardouschemical
Chemicals that have dangerous characteristics such as flammable, explosive, toxic, and corrosive, and are likely to cause personal injury, property damage, and environmental pollution during production, storage, transportation, use, and waste disposal, are all hazardous chemicals. 2.2
Inherently safer designIn the design process, the process and its equipment are made to have the inherent function of fundamentally preventing accidents by means of reduction, mitigation, substitution and simplification.
Hazard identification: The process of identifying the existence of hazardous sources and determining their characteristics based on the physical and chemical properties of raw materials, intermediates and products, the evaluated equipment, facilities, process flow, device layout, etc. 2.4
Tolerable riskTolerable risk
According to the level of today's society, the risk that can be accepted within a given range. 2.5
Process safety
process safety
Prevent the accidental release of hazardous substances or energy that has a serious impact on safety, environment or enterprise. 2.6
Safety instrumented systemSafety instrumented system (SIS) is an instrument system used to implement one or more instrument safety functions. SIS can be composed of any combination of sensors, logic solvers and final elements.
Safety Integritysafetyintegrity
The average probability that a safety instrumented system meets the required instrumented safety functions within a specified period of time and under all specified conditions. 1
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Safety Integrity Levelsafetyintegritylevel (SIL) is used to specify the discrete level (one of four levels) of safety integrity requirements assigned to the instrumented safety functions of the safety instrumented system. SIL4 is the highest level of safety integrity and SIL1 is the lowest. 3 Project Safety Design Procedure
3.1 The project safety design procedure can be integrated with the relevant procedures of the quality management system or occupational health, safety and environmental management system of each unit according to its actual situation, or an independent management procedure can be established. 3.2 The project safety design procedure should generally include the following elements: Collection, review and confirmation of basic data of project safety design; a)
Regulations and other requirements that the project safety design should comply with c)
Policies and objectives of project safety design:
Planning of project safety design;
Analysis of process hazard sources:
Design of project safety countermeasures:
Review of project safety design;
Confirmation of project safety design;
i) Changes to project safety design.
3.3 This standard focuses on providing management guidelines for methods and procedures for "project safety design planning", "process hazard source analysis", "chemical safety countermeasures design", "project safety design review", and "project safety design changes". 4 Project safety design planning
The design unit should make a comprehensive plan for the project safety design in advance according to the nature, scale, contract requirements and design stage of the project, and include the planning results in the project implementation plan/project commencement report or prepare an independent project safety design plan. The main contents of project safety design planning include:
Clearly define the policy, objectives and requirements of project safety design: a)
Determine the project safety design management model, organizational structure and division of responsibilities; b)
Clearly define the scope, basis, laws, regulations, standards and relevant requirements of project safety design: c)
d) Carry out the time, method, content and requirements of process hazard source analysis and project safety design review; formulate a project safety design plan.
5 Process Hazard Source Analysis
5.1 Basic Requirements for Process Hazard Source Analysis
5.1.1 Process hazard source analysis is an organized and systematic safety design review that identifies process hazards and analyzes the causes and consequences of their generation. The review results will provide a basis for decision-making for designers to correct or improve project safety design and improve the safety design level of construction projects.
5.1.2 Process hazard source analysis should be specified in the project safety design plan based on the scale and nature of the specific project and the requirements stipulated in the contract. 5.1.3 Preparation and planning should be carried out before the process hazard source analysis begins. The design unit should determine the analysis object, self-standard and content, select appropriate methods, form a review team, and formulate a review schedule based on the design scope, risk size, design stage, completeness of safety information collection and contract requirements of the chemical construction project. 5.1.4. The process hazard analysis should be performed by a team composed of personnel with different professional backgrounds (if necessary, personnel with operational experience should also be hired). At least the team leader should fully understand the review method used. The design unit should plan to train the review team leader and review personnel.
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5.1.5 The following issues should be noted when analyzing the process hazard sources: AQ/T3033-2010
Identify potential hazard sources that may lead to fire, explosion, toxic gas release or major leakage of flammable chemicals and hazardous chemicals: a)
Identify events that have occurred in similar devices that may lead to potential catastrophic consequences in the workplace: b)
c) Identify equipment, instruments, public works, personnel activities (conventional and unconventional), and various hazardous factors from outside the process:
d) Identify and evaluate the adequacy and reliability of the safety countermeasures that have been taken in the design: e) Identify and evaluate the technical and management measures to control the consequences of accidents: f) Evaluate the impact of the failure of accident control measures on the safety and health of on-site operators. 5.1.6 The process hazard source analysis should be recorded, and the review output should establish a tracking procedure to ensure that the issues and suggestions raised in the review can be implemented as required and recorded and archived.
5.2 Basic procedures for process hazard analysis
The basic procedures for process hazard analysis generally include: specifying the basis, object, scope and objectives of process hazard analysis; a)
collecting data and relevant information required for process hazard analysis; b)
identifying process hazards;
determining risks and conducting risk assessment (refer to Appendix A); proposing risk control measures;
forming analysis result documents:
g) tracking and re-evaluation of risk control.
5.3 Basic methods for process hazard analysis
The process hazard analysis method is an important means to ensure the quality of process hazard identification and assessment. The design unit shall adopt one or more of the following methods applicable to process hazard analysis for the analysis of process hazards: a) Preliminary Hazards Analysis Preliminary hazard analysis is mainly used for the identification and evaluation of the main hazards of materials, equipment and process processes in the early stage of project development (such as the conceptual design stage), providing a basis for scheme comparison and project decision-making. b) Fault hypothesis analysis (What-If)
Fault hypothesis analysis is to systematically propose fault hypotheses for each step of the process and operation, and organize experts to brainstorm and discuss the fault hypotheses, identify and evaluate the impact of abnormal quantity or quality of material components, equipment function failures or program errors on the process. It is mainly used for relatively simple processes from raw materials to products. The core of this method is that the hypothesis of the problem should be designed in advance by experienced experts. c) Safety checklist analysis (Checklist) Safety checklist analysis is a method of listing a series of objects, such as the surrounding environment, general layout, process, equipment, operation, safety facilities, emergency system, etc. in a checklist, and checking and evaluating them one by one. For a typical safety checklist, see Appendix C: For the identified hazard source, the hazard level should be determined and the risk assessment should be carried out. See Appendix A. Safety checklist analysis can be applied to all stages of design, but the design equipment should have mature experience, understand the relevant laws, regulations, standards and regulations, and prepare appropriate safety checklists in advance. d) What-If/Checklist Analysis: What-If/Checklist analysis is a method of raising questions based on what-if and conducting a comprehensive analysis of the questions by comparing them with the safety checklist. This method can be applied to the analysis of more complex process hazards because it absorbs the creativity of what-if analysis and the standardization of safety checklist analysis.
e) Hazard and Operability Study (HAZoP): Hazard and Operability Study, or HAZOP for short, is a technical method for a group of members with different professional backgrounds to systematically review the process in a structured and orderly manner under the chairmanship of the group leader. It takes the process instrumentation diagram (PID) as the research object and, under the guidance of the guide words, identifies and evaluates the potential hazards and operability problems that may be caused by the deviation of all important process parameters in the system from the expected design conditions, as well as the safety protection measures that have been taken in the design, and proposes problems that need to be further identified by the designer and suggestions for modifying the design or operating instructions. The application of HAZOP has evolved and developed in various forms for different objects and goals, and has almost been extended to all stages of the device life cycle including design. (See Figure 1 Schematic diagram of hazard and operability study) Guide words
Deviation of process parameters from design intentions
Events at the top of the accident tree
Figure 1 Schematic diagram of hazard and operability study
f) Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) Failure type refers to the form of functional failure of equipment or subsystems, such as: opening, closing, connecting, cutting off, leaking, corroding, deforming, breaking, burning, falling off, etc. Failure type and effect analysis (EMEA) is a research method for the above-mentioned various types of functional failures. This method is mainly used for the analysis of equipment functional failures and can also be used in conjunction with HAZOP. The analysis methods generally include: 1) Identify potential fault types; Analyze the consequences of faults (the impact of faults on the entire system, subsystems, and personnel): determine the danger level (for example: high, medium, and low); 4) Determine the probability of faults; Identify fault detection methods; Propose suggestions for improved design. g) Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) Fault Tree Analysis is a system safety analysis method that uses logical symbols for deduction. It starts with a specific accident (top event) and lists the sequence events (faults) that may cause the accident and their probability of occurrence, like an extended branch, and then finds the basic cause of the accident through probability calculation, that is, the bottom event of the fault tree. This method is mainly used for the analysis of major catastrophic accidents, such as fires, explosions, and toxic gas leaks: It is also particularly suitable for evaluating the effect of two optional safety facilities on reducing the possibility of the occurrence of the event; this method can be used for both qualitative and quantitative analysis. h) Other appropriate methods
In addition to the above recommended methods, the design unit may also consider other appropriate methods. 5.4 Factors for selecting process hazard source analysis methods Different process hazard source analysis methods have certain applicable scopes and conditions. The following factors should generally be considered for the selection of analysis methods: the scale and complexity of chemical construction projects: a)
The results of the preliminary hazard analysis of the project; the results of the project safety assessment and environmental impact assessment; the depth of new technology adoption;
The stage of design;
Requirements of laws and regulations;
Requirements of the contract or owner:
Requirements of the contract stakeholders:
i) Others.
5.5 Preliminary work process hazard source analysis
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5.5.1 Purpose of preliminary work process hazard source analysis AQ/T3033-2010
a) Identify potential hazardous chemicals and process hazards that require special attention. Review the intrinsic safety design of the process route and process plan:
b) Demonstrate the safety conditions of the chemical construction project according to the owner's requirements and evaluate the feasibility of the project site selection; c) Confirm the missing important information and prompt the attention points of the next level process hazard source analysis. 5.5.2. The key points of the hazard source analysis in the preliminary work process a) Analyze the hazardous chemicals used in the process. According to the reviewed and confirmed hazardous chemical material safety data sheet (MSDS) and related data, analyze the hazards of all materials in the process (including raw materials, intermediates, by-products, final products, catalysts, solvents, impurities, emissions, etc.): 1)
Qualitatively or quantitatively determine the hazardous characteristics and degree of hazard of the materials 2)
Process inventory and total amount of hazardous materials;
Compatibility between materials:
Compatibility between materials and equipment materials: Detection methods of hazardous sources;
Technical requirements for the use, processing, storage and transfer of hazardous materials and the hazards they exist; Propose quantitative analysis requirements for hazardous sources that need to be quantitatively analyzed Analyze potential hazardous sources from processing and handling processes Analyze hazardous sources in processing and handling processes based on process flow charts, unit equipment layout diagrams, basic safety data of hazardous chemicals, and results of material hazard source analysis: 1) In connection with the material processing and handling process, identify the possibility and severity of dangers and hazards such as fire, explosion, and toxic gas leakage in the equipment (qualitative and quantitative analysis): Identify the mutual influence of accidents between different equipment: 2) Identify the mutual influence of accidents between independent devices; 3) Identify the mutual influence between one type of hazardous source and another type of hazardous source; 4 Identify the mutual influence between the device and the surrounding environment. 5) c) Analyze the feasibility of the construction project Based on the general layout plan, the surrounding facilities area map, the results of the analysis of the inherent hazardous sources of the construction project, and the collection, investigation and collation of the external conditions of the construction project, analyze the feasibility of the construction project and put forward suggestions for project decision-making. 5.5.3 Results of the hazard source analysis in the preliminary work process The results of the hazard source analysis in the preliminary work process are determined by the objects, objectives and contents determined by the analysis. The results that may be obtained include all or part of the following:
Basic data on the hazardous and harmful properties of materials; a)
A list of the total amount of hazardous and harmful materials in each part of the device; Identification and evaluation of potential hazardous sources:
A list of hazardous sources that require special attention: Suggestions on quantitative evaluation of major hazardous sources that affect other devices and surrounding areas; Comprehensive evaluation and suggestions for project decisions; g)
Suggestions on intrinsic safety countermeasures and other safety countermeasures h)
Suggestions on site selection and general layout: Guiding principles for disaster emergency plans:
A list of missing data.
5.6 Analysis of Hazard Sources in Basic Engineering Design Process 5.6.1 Purpose of Hazard Source Analysis in Basic Engineering Design Process 5
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a) Through a systematic review of the output of basic engineering design, ensure that all potential unacceptable hazards are fully identified and evaluated and reliable preventive control measures are taken; b) Identify and evaluate the adequacy, reliability and compliance of the safety facility design that has been adopted in the basic engineering design; c) Review the execution results of the hazard source analysis of the previous work process, and include the unclosed issues in the review at this level: d) Provide a basis for the preparation of the "Special Chapter on Safety Facility Design for Construction Projects". 5.6.2 Analysis of Hazard Sources in Professional Processes
The relevant design disciplines should conduct a process hazard source analysis of the basic engineering design of their disciplines in accordance with the adopted laws, standards, specifications and regulations based on the hazard source analysis of the previous work process and the "Safety Evaluation Report for the Establishment of Construction Projects". The analysis of professional process hazards is carried out simultaneously with the safety design review of each discipline.
a) The forms of analysis include:
Self-examination by the designer:
2) Expert review;
3) The professional group selects one or more methods provided in 5.3 for review. The content of the analysis includes:
Whether the questions and suggestions raised by the professional in the hazard source analysis of the preliminary work process have been answered and measures have been taken, and whether the safety of the new measures has been evaluated;
Whether the questions and suggestions raised by the professional in the hazard source analysis of the basic engineering design system have been answered and measures have been taken, and whether the safety of the new measures has been evaluated:
Whether the questions and suggestions raised by the professional in the "Safety Evaluation Report for the Establishment of Construction Projects" have been answered and measures have been taken, 3)
Whether the safety of the new measures has been evaluated;
4) Requirements for special analysis of this profession.
Systematic process hazard source analysis
a) Systematic process hazard source analysis refers to the use of analysis methods such as HAZOP to conduct a multi-professional, systematic and detailed review of a selected design device (unit), evaluate the impact between various parts of the factory and propose suggestions for further measures. b) Systematic process hazard source analysis should generally be implemented by a team composed of personnel with different professional backgrounds under the chairmanship of the team leader. ) Systematic process hazard source analysis should be carefully planned to clarify the purpose, object and scope of the analysis: prepare sufficient information and data; select appropriate analysis methods; determine the composition of the analysis team members; and formulate a feasible implementation plan. d) The procedure of systematic process hazard source analysis is determined by the analysis method adopted. The HAZOP method is a more commonly used method for systematic process hazard source analysis. The method generally includes the following steps: divide the system into several parts (for example: reactor, storage equipment); 1
Select a node for study (for example: pipeline, container, pump, operating instructions); explain the design intention of this node:
Select a process parameter;
Select a guide word to apply to the process parameter to identify meaningful deviations; analyze the causes of deviations;
Analyze the consequences associated with the deviations:
Identify the protective measures that have been taken;
Determine the severity level of the consequences:
10) Determine the likelihood level of the consequences:
11) Determine the level of risk:
12) Assess the acceptability of the risk:
13) Make suggestions for improvement:
14) Repeat the above steps for other process parameters. 6
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HAZOP procedure diagram is shown in Figure 2
Record results and causes
Recommended corrective actions
Form an audit report
Divide the part into nodes
Select a node
Use all guide words
and relevant combinations of parameters
, identify whether there are
any hazards and operational
problems?
Unsure
Need more information
Figure 2 HAZOP procedure diagram
AQ/T3033-2010
Systematic process hazard source analysis should form detailed audit records and written audit reports and track the implementation of subsequent measures. The following issues should be noted in the analysis of system process hazards: 1) The review team should ensure full coverage of the review object under the guidance of the method, so that all potential unacceptable hazards can be identified as much as possible:
When analyzing, attention should be paid to the impact of the hazard source on the entire system and other units; 2
Some devices seem to have no direct connection from the process itself, but they are adjacent to each other from the layout. When analyzing, great attention should be paid to the mutual influence between them; when analyzing each part, the operation mode of the device should be considered, for example: 4)
Normal operation:
Reduced operation:
Normal start:
Normal parking;
Emergency parking;
Test run:
Special operation mode.
5) Attention should be paid to the identification and evaluation of the safety facilities adopted in the design, especially the interrelated primary response, secondary response and even multiple response facilities.
5.7 Hazard analysis of detailed engineering design process 5.7.1 Purpose of hazard analysis of detailed engineering design process Detailed engineering design process hazard analysis is a supplementary analysis based on the hazard analysis of basic engineering design process to prevent new risks caused by omissions (including interfaces supplied by manufacturers) and design changes. 5.7.2 Key points of hazard analysis of detailed engineering design process a) Suggestions of hazard analysis of basic engineering design process on detailed engineering design; b)
Remaining issues of hazard analysis of basic engineering design process; Design changes caused by various reasons such as design scheme adjustment and determination of complete equipment manufacturer documents; AQ/T××××-××××
d) HAZOP analysis required by the owner or relevant supervisory and management agencies for part or all of the project, 6 Project safety countermeasures
6.1 Design principles of project safety countermeasures
6.1.1 Principle of priority for accident prevention
Sort by the principle of priority for accident prevention:
a) Eliminate or reduce hazards by adopting the method of intrinsically safe design Reduction: Minimize the use and storage of hazardous materials: 1)
Substitution: If reduction is not possible, select relatively less hazardous materials and processes with a small risk factor to minimize 2)
Use of safety measures:
Mitigation: Minimize the dangerous state through mild reaction conditions: Simplification: The designed equipment should eliminate unnecessary complexity, make operation less prone to errors, and allow errors to occur. 4)
Adopt facilities to prevent accidents to prevent accidents caused by device failure and operational errors: 1)
Detection and alarm facilities;
Equipment safety protection facilities:
Explosion-proof facilities:
Workplace protection facilities;
Safety warning signs.
Principle of reliability priority
Sort by reliability priority:
Adopt passive safety technical measures, and do not need to start any active elements or functions to eliminate or reduce risks, such as a)
Oil spill prevention dikes;
Fire and explosion-proof walls;
Equipment and pipelines with higher pressure levels.
Adopt active safety technical measures, which can automatically start functions to prevent accidents or mitigate the consequences of accidents, such as: 1
Safety instrument system (SIS):
Pressure relief device.
Adopt procedural management measures to prevent accidents, such as: standard operating procedures;
Emergency response procedures:
Special training procedures:
Safety management system.
Principles of Targetedness, Operability and Economic Rationality Take targeted safety countermeasures and measures according to the characteristics of chemical construction projects and the conclusions of risk assessment; a)
Safety countermeasures and measures should be feasible and operable in terms of economy, technology and time; c) When safety technical measures conflict with economic benefits, we should take a comprehensive approach and make a comprehensive balance. While giving priority to the requirements of chemical safety technical measures, we should avoid the increase of engineering construction investment and operation costs caused by unnecessary and excessive standards. 6.2 Project safety countermeasures and measures should strictly implement the requirements of relevant laws, standards, specifications and regulations a) The design of project safety countermeasures and measures involves a large number of technical and management laws, standards, specifications and regulations. All design disciplines should strictly identify and implement the requirements of relevant laws, standards, specifications and regulations. b) The design unit should establish and maintain procedures to identify and obtain the requirements of applicable laws, standards, specifications and regulations; the information on the requirements of relevant laws, standards, specifications and regulations should be updated in a timely manner, and this information should be communicated to all designers and other relevant stakeholders. 6.3 Preparation of "Special Chapter on Safety Facilities Design for Construction Projects" 8
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